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Cogitave

Trust & assurance

Trust is anengineeringsurface.

Security, evaluation, data boundaries, deployment, evidence, and recovery are designed with the system—not attached after it.

Assurance domains

Six concerns that cross every layer.

The applicable controls depend on the workload, environment, and risk. The responsibility to make those choices explicit does not.

A / 01

Data boundaries

Define what data may enter, where it may move, who may use it, how long it remains, and what evidence survives the interaction.

  • Location & movement
  • Retention & deletion
  • Provenance & lineage
A / 02

Identity & authority

Make human, service, agent, tool, and device identities distinct, scoped, revocable, and observable across every delegation boundary.

  • Authentication
  • Least authority
  • Delegation & revocation
A / 03

Evaluation & release

Connect acceptance criteria to representative workloads, failure behaviour, regressions, and the conditions required to advance a release claim.

  • Task evaluations
  • Release gates
  • Failure distribution
A / 04

Software integrity

Treat source, dependencies, build inputs, artifacts, configuration, deployment, and update paths as one verifiable delivery system.

  • Build provenance
  • Dependency control
  • Signed delivery
A / 05

Operational evidence

Design traces, metrics, decisions, audit records, and ownership so operators can understand what happened and why.

  • Observability
  • Decision records
  • Operational ownership
A / 06

Recovery & resilience

Plan degradation, containment, rollback, restoration, and learning before the system reaches the moment that demands them.

  • Degraded modes
  • Containment & rollback
  • Recovery exercises

Evidence ladder

A claim should say how far it has travelled.

  1. 01Intended

    A property is part of the architecture or design objective. It has not yet been demonstrated.

  2. 02Implemented

    The mechanism exists and can be inspected, but its claim remains bounded by current testing.

  3. 03Verified

    Defined evidence supports the claim within a stated workload, environment, and version.

  4. 04Operated

    Production behaviour, ownership, incidents, and change history provide continuing evidence.

Deployment models

Place the boundary where the system needs it.

These are architecture models, not universal availability claims. Technology, support, compliance, and operating responsibility are confirmed for each system.

ModelSystem boundaryControlOperationTypical fit
Customer cloud

System boundaryCustomer-owned cloud account or tenant

ControlCustomer identity, network, keys, and policy

OperationShared or customer-led, defined per system

Typical fitEnterprise integration and governed AI workloads

Private / on-premise

System boundaryCustomer-controlled infrastructure

ControlLocal identity and data plane

OperationRunbooks and ownership aligned to the environment

Typical fitResidency, sovereignty, or constrained connectivity

Hybrid

System boundaryExplicitly divided cloud and private responsibilities

ControlContracted interfaces and data movement

OperationEnd-to-end telemetry without hidden ownership gaps

Typical fitSystems of record connected to new intelligence

Edge / disconnected

System boundaryDevice or local site remains operationally authoritative

ControlSigned policy, bounded actuation, local fallback

OperationStore-and-forward evidence and controlled recovery

Typical fitRobotics, embedded, industrial, and field systems

Claim discipline

What this page does—and does not—claim.

Maturity
Product and research maturity is stated per surface.
Platform scope
Named platforms do not imply certification or formal partner status.
Compliance
Formal legal interpretation, audit, and certification remain with qualified independent parties.
Security claims
A property is bounded by its version, deployment, workload, and available evidence.